Middle EastAnalysis

Middle East crisis feeds into Trump’s foreign policy narrative

If the US is drawn into a regional conflict, it will bolster the Republican argument about the weakness of the Biden administration

A destroyed building in Hod HaSharon, Israel, following Tuesday's Iranian missile attack. Photograph: Jack Guez/AFP via Getty Images
A destroyed building in Hod HaSharon, Israel, following Tuesday's Iranian missile attack. Photograph: Jack Guez/AFP via Getty Images
Gideon Rachman
Wed Oct 02 2024 - 10:45

For the past year, the Biden administration has struggled to prevent a regional war in the Middle East, fearing that it might draw in the US or wreak havoc on the world economy.

This policy is now very close to failing. For the second time this year, Iran has fired missiles at Israel, and the US has helped Israel to shoot the missiles down. Jake Sullivan, the US national security adviser, has promised that there will be “severe consequences” for Iran and has said that the US will “work with Israel” to ensure that this is the case. That sounds ominously like a threat of joint US-Israeli military action against Iran.

In April, Israel was persuaded to limit its retaliation to a level that the Iranians could tacitly accept – and the tit-for-tat exchange stopped. This time around, it seems much less likely that the exchange of blows between Iran and Israel can be prevented from escalating further.

Israel has just launched a second front in its war with its regional enemies, with a ground incursion into Lebanon that follows up on the devastating blows it has already landed on Hizbullah, the Iran-backed militant force. The government of Binyamin Netanyahu clearly feels that it has its enemies on the run. It may want to hit back hard at Iran, hoping to do lasting damage to the Islamic republic and perhaps to its feared nuclear programme.

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The Iranians will certainly have understood the risks of Israeli counter-escalation, and some in Tehran may fear that they are walking into a trap by once again firing missiles at Israel. But failing to respond to Israel’s attacks on Hizbullah – which follow the assassination in July of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, in Tehran – will also have seemed like a serious risk for Iran.

The grim logic of war and deterrence suggests that a power that is unable to defend its friends, or to respond to attacks in its capital, looks weak. And weakness potentially invites further attacks, while also leading to a loss of influence and prestige.

Behind its tough talk, the White House may still be urging Israel to calibrate its response and to not hit back so hard that Iran feels compelled to up the ante again. After pulling out of Afghanistan, the Biden administration has no desire to be dragged into another conflict in the Middle East.

With Israeli forces already fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, the Netanyahu government may have its own reasons not to escalate the direct conflict with Iran right now. But if the Israelis decide that they do want to take much tougher direct action, they have already shown that they are perfectly happy to ignore the Biden administration’s calls for restraint. The White House may hope that by working with Israel, it can exercise more influence over the strength and nature of the Israeli response.

The US had been urging Israel for many months not to launch an assault on Hizbullah. After Israel opened hostilities last month, the Biden administration joined the UK, France and others in urging an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon. It was ignored once again.

The Netanyahu government’s readiness simply to ignore the wishes of its closest ally and security guarantor stems from a paradox at the heart of US policy. The Biden administration can and does urge Israel to show restraint in Gaza and Lebanon. But it will also always protect Israel from the consequences of escalation, citing the overarching commitment to defend it from Iran and its other regional enemies.

As a result, the Israeli government understands that defying the Biden administration is almost risk-free. Indeed, there could even be some benefits if it draws the US into deploying its military might against Iran.

The chances of America refusing to back Israel in a crisis – always slight – are further minimised by the fact that the US presidential election is little more than a month away. Kamala Harris has flirted with taking a tougher line with Netanyahu on Gaza. But she will also want to appear tough and fully supportive of Israel at a time of danger. And she cannot risk appearing to be soft on Iran, with which the US has its own long history of antagonism, dating back to the hostage crisis of 1979-81.

Nonetheless, the current perilous situation could be bad news for Harris. Donald Trump likes to claim that the world was at peace during his presidency, but that the “weakness” of the Biden administration has led to wars in Europe and the Middle East. This latest escalation suits his narrative perfectly.

Every time there is a presidential election in America, there is speculation about a possible “October surprise” that upturns the race with only weeks left before the vote. Israel and Iran have just delivered this election’s October surprise, and Trump may be the beneficiary.

– Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2024