Both sides of the Brexit campaign have been characterised by negativity. For the Brexiters, phrases such as “democratic deficit”, “economic strain” and “undermining sovereignty” highlight the discourse. For the “Bremainers”, a term coined by Boris Johnson which hasn’t quite taken off, Brexit would have disastrous economic consequences.

There has been little, if any, attempt to emphasise European solidarity, identity, a shared history and commitment to the ideals of the European project.

As Dominick Chilcott, the British ambassador to Ireland, pointed out in a recent discussion on Brexit at Trinity College, Britain’s membership of the EU is unique in many ways.

Aside from being a thorn in the EU’s side, Britain’s membership began and continues on an almost purely economic basis and does not hold many of the main insurances as for other nations.

For many continental European nations, faith in the EU is “unshakable.” Chilcott pointed out that for France and Germany, the European project began as a means to achieve lasting peace in Europe. For Spain, Portugal and Greece, the EU was instrumental in securing the move away from dictatorship.

For Central and Eastern European nations the EU is guarantor of their free market economies and young democracies, guarding against a retreat into totalitarianism and overt Russian influence. For Ireland, the European project has contributed to rapid modernisation and stability in the North.

Why, since the beginning of its EC membership and continuing to today, has the UK stuck out as such an “awkward partner” to the EU, as Stephen George concluded in 1990? Perhaps, as Chilcott says, it is because the UK has different and less intensely negative memories of war, with Britain having avoided invasion for the past 200 years.

Perhaps it is the geographical distance between the UK and Continental Europe and its insular nature. Perhaps it is because the EU is not the foremost guarantor of Britain’s democracy, modernisation and stability.

Perhaps it is because of the UK’s “special relationship” with the US. Or perhaps it is because Great Britain has not quite reconciled itself with the fact that it is no longer “great”. “Attacks” on its sovereignty thus become harder to bear.

Whatever it may be, for many, there is no overarching reason for the UK to stay. As the debate shows, it is a question of pros and cons. The ideal of the togetherness of Europe and of European solidarity has not really been a feature.

In the late 1940s and 1950s the UK resisted any moves to bring it closer to the Continental economies. Britain’s global interests took precedence.

In 1957 Britain declined to join the founding members of the EEC. But with its economy flagging, she sought to enter the community in 1963. Charles de Gaulle later vetoed Britain’s application for membership of the EEC and accused Britain of “deep-seated hostility” to the European movement. In the last referendum on membership to the European community in 1975, 66 per cent of Britons voted to stay.

During  Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as PM, the UK-EU relationship was characterised by hostility, demonstrated by her public statements, clashes with other EU leaders, and aggression towards the project. She would not be the first, nor the last British leader, to be sceptical about further European integration.

In 1991, John Major secured an opt-out clause for Britain of the Eurozone as well as the Maastricht Treaty’s social chapter. Later, the UK was able to avoid membership of the borderless Schengen Area, preferring to control its own borders. This meant Ireland did not either, in order to avoid reinstating the North-South border.

For Daniel Tarschys, former secretary-general of the Council of Europe, European identity is “a very strong commitment to the individual, a commitment to social cohesion and solidarity, a state that is neither too strong nor too weak, respect for human rights, tolerance…the rule of law of course, the idea that government must be bound by legal principles and that people must be treated equally."

There is little here that Britain could argue with, either in terms of the definition or the commitment to it.

But they do: Boris Johnson proudly declared, “There is simply no common political culture in Europe.” A few days later, he compared the EU project to the failed regimes of Napoleon and Hitler. Incidentally, it is Napoleon we have to thank for putting in motion principles such as public education, emancipation of minorities, legal protections and equality before the law, which underpin the constitutions of most civilised Western states.

Former vice-president of the European Commission, Leon Brittan, noted, “If they [people] see a Europe that is positive, that is open to the outside world, that doesn't seek to impose excessive regulation, that creates wealth, that cares for employment and that is doing good for the citizens, then over a period of time, people will feel an emotional attachment as well as an intellectual support for such a Europe, but without in any way feeling less affection, allegiance or loyalty to their own countries. I see no reason why you shouldn't have both." This however has not seem to have held true for the English.

A 2015 EU report on European identity shows that between 78 per cent and 88 per cent of the population in states such as Luxembourg, France, Estonia, Latvia and Germany feel they are citizens of the EU. For the first time ever, at least half the population of every member state feels a citizen of the EU. Even in countries such as Hungary where recent events have seen a rise in Euroscepticism, 67 per cent feel European.

In 2012, such figures were in stark contrast to the UK, in which only 27 per cent responded positively to this question. Despite the latest survey showing that 56 per cent of Britons feel they are citizens of the EU, this is the fifth lowest figure, with Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus following.

Some EU citizens even consider themselves primarily, or only European. In 2013, 2 per cent of Europeans considered themselves only European, and 5 per cent considered themselves primarily European, and secondly their nationality-low but nonetheless significant figures.

Being European, or feeling like a citizen of Europe, and having a sense of nationality, are not mutually exclusive. For the large majority, their national identity will come first. But we undoubtedly have many things in common, whether that is a shared history, shared religion, shared political values or civil rights.

Of course, feeling European is no indicator of holding pro-EU views.

A 2014 review by the Economic and Social Research Council found that only 15 per cent of Britons feel European. Amongst these 51 per cent believed Britain should continue in the EU. But the distinction is important to make as, with no overriding ideological commitment to the European project, Britain’s membership becomes tenuous at best - in it for the practicalities, doubting the ideals.

The figures show that it would have been quite irrational for the Remain campaign to use the idea of fostering a shared sense of European identity as a focal point of their campaign. And this is precisely why perhaps the EU would be better without Britain, whose absence would allow them to reform and progress more quickly.

Although on paper European solidarity and shared identity and culture are not focal points of the EU project, this has certainly been an unwritten and underlying impetus for the project, and why the prospect of Turkey joining the EU is so abhorrent to many people.

For some, such as Daniel Hannan, a conservative MEP who supports Brexit, the debate is not about feeling part of Europe, or being anti-Europe, but rather a question of support or otherwise of the political and economic union. Yet to consider the EU as simply a political and economic union is to underestimate the great power it has had and will continue to have over civil rights, peace, equality, freedom of expression, human rights, mutual respect and European solidarity.

Additionally, the UK has been described as “America’s poodle” on foreign policy matters, pushing the American agenda in the EU.

Their constant garnering of exemptions on so many areas of European policy has led to mismatched treatment of EU nations, which is ultimately restricting the project. If the UK sought to join the EU on the basis of its relationship at the moment, it would not be allowed to enter.

Most sensible people would agree that the EU faces various institutional problems. Yet the first reaction to this is not to want to leave, but rather to seek to change this.

If the polls are anything to go by, the outcome of the referendum will be tight. If Britain votes to stay in the EU by a small majority, she will continue to be a reluctant member of a union which has significant issues of her own to confront. If Britain is not committed to the ideology of a greater Europe, but rather to the viability of membership of an economic union, progress on issues such as migration and democratic accountability will be slow.

Despite all this, I haven’t quite reconciled my British -or rather English- scepticism with the damage a Brexit could do to Ireland and in particular to the North. In the case of a Brexit, things for us would get worse before they would get better. If we do not look out for our island, UK politicians certainly will not.