Bertie Ahern was seen by the British as a secretive, pragmatic dealmaker during the peace process but also as a leader with a ruthless streak that caused his immediate circle to be wary of him, newly released archive files show.
The UK ambassador to Ireland in 1998 said the then taoiseach was “critical to success” in the talks which led to the Belfast Agreement, while describing him as a leader with a tight grip on Fianna Fáil who commanded firm authority across backbench TDs.
A new release of files by the National Archives in London detail communications at senior levels of Tony Blair’s Labour government in the early part of 1998, at a time when Sinn Féin had been excluded from the talks due to murders carried out by the IRA.
In a briefing profile of Mr Ahern in the run-up to a meeting, the British ambassador to Ireland Veronica Sutherland wrote that he used foreign affairs ministers David Andrews and Liz O’Donnell, and adviser Paddy Teahon; secretary general of the Department of the Taoiseach Martin Manseragh; Tim Dalton, secretary general of the Department of Justice, and Dermot Gallagher of the Department of Foreign Affairs when he wanted, but kept tight control of decisions.
“In all this, Ahern keeps his own counsel. I have been struck by the way he personally manages this whole process. He uses his two ministers (Andrews and O’Donnell) and his gang of four (Teahon, Dalton, Gallagher and Manseragh) as it suits him, but he does not fully rely on them, and at tricky points he takes over personally,” wrote Ms Sutherland to Mr Blair’s private secretary John Holmes.
“His subordinates have good reason to be wary of him. He can be ruthless, as demonstrated by his treatment of both Ray Burke and, more recently, Charlie McCreevey, minister of finance, both of whom he humiliated in the wider interests of the survival of the government.”
The memo looks at the motivating reasons for Mr Ahern’s approach to the peace process, saying he is a pragmatist at heart despite his family’s republican background and that he leads a party which aspires to a united Ireland within 20 years.
“Ahern, in common with every Taoiseach, would like to be the man responsible for that hitherto elusive achievement: an agreed settlement in the North,” she says. “He, however, knows (and there is collateral evidence for this) that his government have neither the means to administrate the North nor the infrastructure to overcome terrorist violence, which poses a far greater threat to the Republic, with its indigenous IRA sympathisers, than it does to Britain.”
In 1998, Sinn Féin held just one Dáil seat — Caoimhghín Ó Caoláin in Cavan Monaghan — but Mr Ahern was wary about the party’s political activities in the South, says Sutherland, at a time when support was mounting in deprived areas of Dublin and in Kerry.
“His is the party which stands to lose the most if Sinn Féin were to gain a stronghold in the Republic,” she wrote.
“If Ahern is to achieve his objective of a settlement in the North which also ideally marginalises Sinn Féin in the South, he has to tread a very careful path. Here his qualities as a negotiator and deal broker stand to him in good stead. He well understands that progress towards a settlement in the North is possible only when the British and Irish governments work together. He must also calculate that it is in the interests of Fianna Fáil to demonstrate publicly the unacceptable face of Sinn Féin.”
The taoiseach had told Ms Sutherland previously that he was determined to work with Ulster unionists as he saw agreement with David Trimble on the key issues as the key to achieving consensus. There had been no move against him from TDs, following the exclusion of Sinn Féin from the talks, as their concerns were centred around parochial issues, she says.
“He may have a minority government but very few of his party care so deeply about the early achievement of a united Ireland that they would openly mount a challenge to him on the issue. That he, a Fianna Fáil leader, has joined with us to exclude Sinn Féin from the talks without any talk of a backbench revolt speaks volumes for his authority.”
Her conclusion to Mr Holmes was that Mr Ahern was “critical to the success in the talks”. “A recent minute of yours rightly commented that we owe Ahern a great deal. Finding some way of expressing that to him at Thursday’s meeting would count a lot, because we’ll need much more from him before it all ends.”
