Our current Government is on the receiving end of no shortage of advice and here is some more: stop hiring advisers.
Rows over special advisers are a regular feature of our political discourse, usually focusing on their numbers and salaries but what about the broader issue of why they are deemed necessary in the first place?
Have we such a dearth of talent and ability in the civil service that the extensive “expertise” of additional hires – there were 57 ministerial advisers for the previous Dáil – is necessary? And is there now an inbuilt acceptance that Ministers have to be surrounded by a cohort of mentors? It can hardly be conducive to their own political maturation or ability to confidently conquer their briefs.
Historically, the Irish civil service was regarded as the equivalent of a permanent, neutral bureaucracy, implementing a government programme as directed by the minister. The legal definition of the minister as “Corporation sole” is part of what Tom Barrington often referred to in the 1980s as “the intense centralisation of Irish government”. But when a review body on remuneration in the higher ranks of the public service was undertaken in 1972 it was asserted that the secretary of a government department, as well as taking ministerial direction, was responsible for providing leadership in “developing new ideas”.
Cheekily, political scientist Basil Chubb described the higher officials of that era as “Christian Brothers school stereotypes . . . intellectually able and hard working but rather narrowly practical in their approach and inclined to be concerned with the short-term objective”.
Rigidity, parsimony and hierarchical mindsets were common in the service. Taoiseach Seán Lemass in 1961 was critical of passive civil servants, loathe “to generate ideas themselves” and risk experimentation. They in turn could also face hostility to showing initiative, but as TK Whitaker averred there were nonetheless quality public servants, including most famously himself, who “helped rescue ministers from remaining prisoners of outmoded policies”.
If they are so wise why did they not exert enough influence to prevent the calamities experienced a decade ago?
Appointing a modest number of ministerial advisers is a very old practice both from inside and outside the public service. Éamon de Valera, for example, retained Timothy Smiddy, a UCC economist, for what were described as “special duties” in the 1930s and 1940s. Jack Lynch used the services of TCD economist Martin O’Donoghue from 1970 to 1973 and later he devised the 1977 Fianna Fáil election manifesto which, given the damage it did, amounted to dire advice. The coalition government before that, from 1973-1977, appointed six non-departmental advisers. From the 1990s, there was much vagueness about government “programme managers”; some were civil servants, some not. Ministerial advisers were not legislated for until the 1997 Public Service Management Act; their appointments are exempt from the rules governing civil servants and politics, meaning they can be members of political parties. Most have worked in what former British cabinet secretary Richard Wilson described in 2002 as “the shadows”.
One of the arguments for appointing so many in contemporary politics is that such is the full load of a modern minister they strengthen ministerial authority by providing a counterbalance to full-time officials. But does that not mean it is likely that senior civil servants will have even less access to Ministers? Surely the existence of so many advisers is tantamount to a recognition that civil servants are still not given ample scope to initiate, or incorporated enough into decision making in areas in which they are qualified, or deprived of a proper career structure within the service to match competencies and professional abilities?
There is also the issue identified by former civil servant Noel Coughlan in 2011: “Attempts by ministerial advisors to arbitrarily prioritise particular policies have destabilised command structures and reinforced pre-existing tendencies towards a ‘good news only’ approach to ministerial request.” Coughlan also criticised “the much touted neo-liberal ‘solution’ of handing our public affairs over to the ‘can-do’ hustlers”.
It is likely some advisers have made positive contributions, and filled gaps that needed to be filled but equally likely some have done significant harm. If they are so insightful and wise why did they not exert enough influence to prevent the calamities experienced a decade ago?
And consider the Renewable Heat Incentive scandal that did so much damage in Northern Ireland and the “rank dysfunctionality” identified in Sam McBride’s book about it, Burned. The inquiry into the debacle led to harsh findings about Arlene Foster and her special adviser concerning the division of responsibility between them for analysing and digesting important documents that led to “false assurance” about the level of scrutiny applied to vital technical reports.
Or consider the arrogance and contempt for critical scrutiny that came with Alistair Campbell as Tony Blair’s adviser, or the destructiveness of Dominic Cummings in Downing Street today. A decade ago, Bernadette Connaughton, public administration expert in the University of Limerick, suggested several profiles to classify Irish ministerial advisers: “experts, partisans, co-ordinators and minders.”
We already have our fill of that cocktail.