High-level talks between the US and Iran over the future of Iran’s nuclear programme ended on Thursday evening without agreement between the two sides but with an undertaking to reconvene in Vienna next week. Iranian sources, as well as Omani mediators, suggested significant progress had been made on key issues. However, there was no comment from the American side, which may reflect a more negative assessment of the deadlocked talks.
The negotiations between Iranian foreign minister Abbas Aragchi and US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner took place against the backdrop of a massive build-up of US military capacity in the Middle East over the course of recent weeks. This has included the deployment by US president Donald Trump of two aircraft carriers, one of which – the USS Gerald R Ford – is the largest of its kind in the world. Other warships, dozens of fighter jets and combat helicopters, as well as more than 5,000 service personnel, have also been sent to the region – along with the 40,000 troops already there.
Tracking data indicates more than half of newly deployed US aircraft landed in bases in Europe, almost certainly in order to keep them out of reach of Iranian missiles in the event of retaliation against any US attack. While some observers note that the build-up constitutes serious leverage for Trump in negotiations with Iran, the scale of the deployment carries the risk of self-fulfilling prophecy. Ordering mobilisation on this level has made it more difficult for Trump to back down.
Yet, what the objectives of any military assault on Iran might be remains unclear, and there is even less clarity regarding what the consequences of any such assault might be.
Trump has been issuing threats against Iran for some time, not least since the violent suppression of widespread protests against the regime earlier this year. Having told the protesters on social media that “help” was on its way, ultimately he took no action, dissuaded by a combination of pressure from Arab leaders and fear of Iranian retaliation.
It may be that the current build-up is at least partly motivated by a concern to diminish the threat from any Iranian counterstrikes. But the ultimate goal of US policy remains opaque.
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Officials have talked variously about containing Iran’s nuclear programme, defusing its ballistic missile capability and constraining its sponsorship of regional proxies. US vice-president JD Vance asserted earlier this week that Washington had evidence Iran was trying to rebuild its nuclear programme. In his state of the union address, Trump referred to his determination to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The Iranians, for their part, deny any such ambitions. Araghchi recently claimed Iran remained “crystal clear” it would, under no circumstances, develop a nuclear weapon, while recognising the right of the Iranian people to the benefits of “peaceful nuclear technology”.
The American president has come under pressure from the Israeli leadership to attack Iran to, at the very least, destroy its missile arsenal. Senior Israeli officials, including the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, made a secret visit to Washington at the end of January to push the US to launch an attack on the country. But other actors in the region are fearful of the possible consequences of a US strike. The leaders of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar favour a diplomatic solution, which would contain Iranian ambitions rather than destabilise the country.
The Gulf states might be happy to see Iran’s leadership weakened but are fearful of a scenario of chaos and uncertainty and the possibility of more radical elements in the regime coming to power. Iran has repeatedly asserted that US bases in the region would be legitimate targets in the event of any American strike, which would place several of the Gulf states in the firing line.
The June 2025 attack by Iran on a US base in Qatar lingers in the memory of Gulf leadership, even if there were no casualties on that occasion. There is clear awareness conflict with Iran could see facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain come under attack. Any conflict with Iran would almost certainly have highly negative economic consequences in both the short and longer terms, with the added potential for a refugee crisis. Iran might also respond to attack with a partial closure of the Straits of Hormuz, through which 20 per cent of the world’s oil passes. This would have obvious and significant impacts in the region and beyond.
There is also a strong possibility of retaliatory Iranian missile attacks against Israel. Israeli officials have speculated in recent days that Iran would find it easier to launch attacks on Israeli rather than US targets, with the added prospect that Iran’s allies in Lebanon and Yemen might join the fray.
However, while there is a great deal of anxiety across the region regarding the possibility of a chaotic end to the regime in Tehran, there is also little certainty this would be the outcome of a US attack.
Undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic has been dramatically weakened by the events of recent years. Its nuclear programme has been effectively neutralised by US and Israeli assaults; its network of regional allies has been thoroughly degraded. The country’s economy has deteriorated enormously since the US withdrew during Trump’s first term in the White House from a previously negotiated deal on Iran’s nuclear programme, followed by the reimposition of US sanctions.
Indeed, the mass protests that broke out across the country at the end of last year were initially prompted by widespread economic distress.
Nonetheless, there are few signs the end of the Islamic Republic is imminent. The regime’s ferocious coercive apparatus appears to be intact. Internal opposition, although widespread, lacks the capacity to govern the country and exiled opposition to the regime is fragmented and weak. Nor would so-called “decapitation” in the form of attacks on the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and senior regime figures necessarily trigger the fall of the regime.
Following previous attacks, there are clear procedures to provide for succession in the case of key positions, while killing Khamenei, who holds a position of major religious as well as political significance, would most likely radicalise rather than moderate the regime.
Should the reconvened talks in Vienna fail to produce an agreement next week, few positive outcomes would be likely from an American assault on Iran.
