You can save yourself a lot of time and trouble by taking people at their word. The British, heirs to an artful conversational culture in which nobody says what they mean, are uniquely bad at it.
After the second World War, British governments never believed Franco-German talk of European unity. When it turned out to be more than metaphorical, London did not think they would act on plans to deepen the project into social policy. When they did, it was sure they would stop short of a monetary union.
As recently as January, David Cameron, prime minister at the time, assumed the European Union was bluffing when it ruled out a drastic revision of his country's terms of membership.
The story of Britain in Europe is a story of naked intent mistaken for something more sophisticated, of ironists confounded by continental literalism.
It is happening again, even as the relationship ends. Everyone in and around British politics strains to understand, and competes to influence, Theresa May’s negotiation strategy – as though the content of the eventual exit deal is largely a matter of what the prime minister asks for.
When scrawled notes from a ministerial meeting are snapped by a photographer, industrialists study them and fear for their access to the single market. When a parliamentary seat falls to pro-European Liberal Democrats in southwest London, hope rallies of a softer exit. Zealots on both sides pore over domestic court rulings as if they contain pointers to the final outcome.
Another clue
You can lose your mind to this conjecture. There will always be another clue, another government leak to suggest the prime minister’s mind is turning this way or that. The trouble with all the eagle-eyed Mayology is its Anglocentric premise: that the British side of the negotiations is the decisive variable. It is a touching thought.
The EU is not a passive party. It is, by population and output, the preponderant force in the talks. It has decades of experience in sparring with nations, including Norway and Switzerland, that cheekily desire a happy niche in its project short of full membership. It will do more to set the terms of Britain's extrication than Britain itself, which was always the best reason to stay.
It is also characteristically candid about what those terms will be, if only we could switch off our Wildean irony radar and accept words at face value. When Donald Tusk says the "only real alternative to a hard Brexit is no Brexit", there is nothing in history to suggest the European Council president is giving us his smoking lounge repartee.
When German chancellor Angela Merkel talks up the indivisibility of the four freedoms, a good time-saving exercise is to believe her. When in the summer EU leaders rejected informal talks with Britain in advance of Article 50 being tabled, ministers in London smiled at the charade and waited for the European line to waver. They still wait.
These are just the EU's public statements but there are no more encouraging whispers being exchanged in private. If David Davis has emerged as the Eurosceptics' lonely realist, airing the prospect that the "best possible access" to the European market will come at some cost, it is because he has done the basic work of diplomacy as minister for EU exit. He has talked to enough European capitals to lose the illusions of the summer. Paris is the hardest in rhetoric but Berlin is no softer in substance.
Brute self-preservation
The EU makes up for the opacity of its institutions with the transparency of its interests. It cannot afford to set the precedent that a member state’s exit can lead to a better life outside or substantial concessions to stay inside. If it does, every nation will chance its arm and the union will crumble. Abhor this brute self-preservation all you like: it is honest self-preservation.
When Ms Merkel said favourable terms for Britain would create a Europe in which everyone does “what they want”, Eurosceptics flinched with their practised blend of outrage and vindication, as though she had let the cynical truth slip in an unguarded moment. But when did she claim otherwise? When did anyone?
What happens in London is less than half the story in the coming years. Yes, British business should assume a hard exit, but not because their own government especially desires one. Yes, Mrs May manages to be vague and bullheaded at the same time, but even a masterly prime minister would have to reckon with the EU’s strategic interest in making exit hurt. Yes, our internal politics merits some analysis, but not as much as the other side’s. They are telling us what we need to know. Human communication is not always and everywhere a kind of intricate dance. – (Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2016)