Among the many features common to Greece and Ireland is the growth and decline of a political party which was central to the country's life for many decades: Pasok and Fianna Fáil.
Almost all of Greece is a closed shop, and politics is no exception. The politikos kosmos is the term for the elite ranks, mostly middle-class professionals (lawyers, economists and professors), at the centre of power. In the 20th century three family dynasties held most of the power.
The most prominent of these are the Papandreous, three generations of whom have held the premiership: George the first (1944-5, 1963 and 1964-5), his son Andreas, the founder of Pasok (1981-9 and 1993-6) and his grandson, George the second (2009-11). Pasok (Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement), founded in 1974, has been in single-party government for 22 of the past 31 years, and a further two years in the current coalition.
George the first was in many ways the saviour of modern Greece, holding together a government of national unity in exile during the second World War. He promulgated the principles of Democratic Socialism based on “Nation, Liberty and Social Justice”.
Post-truth party
The Greek word for “truth” is
alethia
– meaning, “no forgetting”. So “truth” requires memory, and memory, for Greeks, is even more painful than it is for the Irish. You cannot afford truth or memory if they stand in the way of expedience. Pasok, having condoned deliberate obfuscation and mis-statements on the country’s economic situation, is today labelled “a post-truth party”.
The fact that, under the military junta (1967-74), George the first was held (and died) under house arrest and that Andreas was forced into exile in the US, raised veneration of the family into sainthood. This obscured the fact that the Papandreous, as defenders of democracy, were in fact creating a state that turned democracy on its head.
Andreas and George the second were the victims of history: Andreas’s marriage to an American, his exile and, as a consequence, his son’s upbringing outside Greece, have made many Greeks suspicious of their bona fides. The left, in particular, brands young George as American rather than Greek which is not helped by his less-than-perfect command of the Greek language.
In founding Pasok after the fall of the junta, Andreas had two imperatives: to heal the wounds caused by the civil war and the junta, and to raise standards and conditions of living, especially in rural areas. Return to democracy, index- linked to a rosy future, was music to Greek ears.
Andreas’s strategy was brilliant and unique in Greek political life: a “contract with the people”. He created nationwide grassroots cumanns which made Pasok, and himself, synonymous with the state – paternalist and clientelist: a social transformation, including eradication of privilege, healthcare, social insurance, equal pay for women, with EU membership bringing agricultural subsidies.
Pasok’s grassroots support depended almost entirely on votes-for-favours, like the Irish TD sorting out his or her constituents’ difficulties by adroit representations. Greece went one better, allowing the system to become permeated by this mindset.
Clientelism shaded ever further into corruption. In effect, it meant “privilege for all”, but it encouraged dependence on a system which, ultimately, Pasok couldn’t deliver. Andreas’s policies drove him to pay for popular support through budget deficits. He was buying necessary peace and false prosperity.
No one recognised that there was more style than substance in all this – or if they did, they kept quiet. The state sector became over-populated with nepotist sinecures, and tax evasion became the norm.
Why then have the fortunes of Pasok plummeted so far that today they have less than 10 per cent of the national vote and possibly no future?
Pasok has been the victim of its own success. Voters – particularly those whose boats were lifted on the Pasok tide of the 1980s – were disgusted that the party couldn’t help them through the current economic crisis. Pasok was culpable (along with the rival party, conservative New Democracy) for allowing the economic situation to reach crisis proportions, resulting in austerity measures previously inconceivable.
Tradition and modernity
When young George assumed leadership of Pasok, almost by divine right, he inherited the dichotomy between tradition and modernity. Within the party, there were reformers like himself who wanted to make Pasok more relevant to Greeks today, and the old guard, for whom the clientelist model was as sacred as the name
Papandreou
.
George saw the flaws in Pasok’s success and had in fact called for his father’s resignation “for the good of the country”. He was principled. Not a great virtue in a crisis. His lacklustre leadership was demonstrated in his tendency to over-consult, to be swayed by external opinions (particularly Angela Merkel’s), and his lack of the killer instinct that is the ultimate test of a politician’s machismo – a classic case of a politician between a rock and a hard place. Eventually even the family charisma (“full of grace” in Greek) could not prevent his exit from politics.
His successor, Evangelis Venizelos, lacks the common touch; the ideological splits within the party are constantly growing. From landslide victories it now has only 27 MPs out of 300. For too long, Greeks had allowed the heart to rule the head. Now it’s very different.
