According to a senior Northern Ireland Office official in 1988, the taoiseach, Charles J Haughey, was guided by “a set of vague, deep-green principles”, regarded Northern Ireland as “a failed political entity” and both admired and feared the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher.
Haughey’s reactions had “a large emotional content”, while in 1988, as in 1982 during the Falklands War, he had shut himself off from Department of Foreign Affairs advice.
These were the views of a senior NIO official, Alan Whysall, following the serious deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations in the early months of 1988 due to the Stalker/Sampson affair, the failure of the Birmingham Six appeal and the “Gibraltar Three” killings.
In his memo to officials, dated May 20th, 1988, Whysall saw clear parallels between the taoiseach’s policies in 1982 and in 1988.
He informed colleagues: “In 1982 Mr Haughey took control of policy and shut himself off from DFA [Department of Foreign Affairs] advice. So it has been this time.”
The British ambassador in Dublin had reported to London that “the DFA did not know what Mr Haughey might say in the USA two days before he spoke [in April 1988].”
Similarly, they had little idea what direction he might take towards the planned review of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The official felt that “the internal workings of the Department of the Taoiseach were difficult to fathom”.
“One might infer”, he suggested, “that Mr Haughey looks to Martin Mansergh [who worked as an adviser to Haughey – described as “the malign influence” in a despatch from the British embassy] [for advice] instead of the DFA”.
However, while Haughey might use Dr Mansergh as a “sounding-board . . . it is difficult to believe that he trusts anybody completely and the strange course that his policies sometimes follow suggests that, not only is he not working out a careful strategy, but also no one is doing it for him.”
‘Felt ignored’
In 1982, Haughey “felt himself ignored or, worse still, expected to fall in unquestionably with British policy, the more difficult he became” and his suspicion of British motives grew rapidly, the official went on.
This pattern had recurred in his vehement reaction to the Stalker/Sampson announcement (that there would be no prosecution of RUC officers involved in controversial “shoot to kill” killings in Co Armagh) and recent developments in Northern Ireland.
In addition, Haughey tended to “take very personally” British newspaper criticism of him though he had been pleased by a recent reference to him by the British foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, as “a great patriot”.
The NIO official told his colleagues: “Many of Mr Haughey’s reactions seem to have a large emotional element, they are not just calculating.
“He appears to cherish a set of vague, deep green principles, centred around the need for a unitary Irish state, the failure of Northern Ireland as a political entity and so forth.”
The British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, had been angered recently by his reluctance to condemn violence in the North in his recent American speeches. Whysall ascribed these to the fact that “he is up in the polls and the agreement is down, giving him leeway to attack it and appeal, perhaps, to his green wing”.
There was no evidence the taoiseach had “a carefully worked-out strategy” for the achievement of his fundamental objectives; rather, his “unpredictable jumps in policy” suggested “more of a gut feeling as to what he could get away with”.
In the official’s view, Haughey’s recent utterances on devolution in the North had sent out the message that “he was altogether against devolution”. This was “very serious” and “against the spirit of the [Anglo-Irish] Agreement”.
‘Balance of power’
Under Haughey’s watch, Whysall felt the agreement, as it operated, did not enable the two governments to understand each other’s thinking as perfectly as they might.
At the start of the agreement, the DFA and Department of the Taoiseach had worked closely together and the secretariat at Maryfield had access to both. This was no longer the case and the DFA “often felt itself left out in the cold on policymaking”.
He felt that the British might adjust to this shift in the balance of power by suggesting the appointment of a “Department of the Taoiseach man” to the joint secretariat.
In Whysall’s view, however, “the person who potentially has by far the most influence with Mr Haughey . . . is the Prime Minister. He clearly admires and also fears her (and the Irish people, we should not omit to tell her, admire no one more, save the Pope and Mother Teresa). If he thought she was listening and at least trying to understand Ireland and the problems he faced, there would surely be great benefits to relations.”
He suggested more regular meetings between the two leaders.
On the wider front, the official felt that the British and especially King should “try to defend Mr Haughey and the Irish people a bit more” in Britain, especially for his help with security.
“Much comment on Ireland in the tabloid press, if not as manifestly racialist as at times in the 1970s, is still dreadful.”
