Driving another nail into the coffin of neutrality

There can be little doubt that when we come to vote on May 22nd we will be putting another nail in the coffin of Irish neutrality…

There can be little doubt that when we come to vote on May 22nd we will be putting another nail in the coffin of Irish neutrality. "Ha!" I hear some of you say, "that stooge of the Brussels bureaucracy is at last about to admit that the Amsterdam Treaty undermines that most cherished, if nebulous, of our national aspirations. At last the truth . . ."

'Fraid not. For it is my contention that what will undermine Irish neutrality in the medium term is not the treaty, which takes us no further down that road than Maastricht, but the Belfast Agreement of Good Friday.

While my colleague Geraldine Kennedy has written of the accord's profound implications for the Irish Constitution, we should also be aware that it is likely to have far-reaching long-term effects on our political culture and most specifically on sacred cows like neutrality.

The question is not posed directly but implicitly - in the longer term are we really prepared to stand aloof from the collective defence of this island now that a political accord has been reached? Would we stand by if our partners in an all-Ireland Council were attacked?

READ SOME MORE

And the absence of an obvious immediate external threat is no answer. That logic would lead to the immediate disbanding of the Army. Imagine the following scenario a few years hence. Unionist cabinet minister, in a moment of divilment, suggests to a Dublin counterpart that perhaps it is time to extend the remit of the all-Ireland Council to external defence (even in jest no unionist is ever going to suggest the pooling of internal security).

"Sorry," says Dublin, "no can do. We don't do military alliances. We are neutral, an honourable policy that has served us well."

"Ah, I see," says his Northern Ireland friend, "so your commitment to all-Ireland bodies does not cover defending them. Ourselves alone! Our friends on the Shankill will be most interested."

Neutrality, defined here as a refusal to get involved in military alliances and specifically to countenance automatic guarantees to come to the defence of a partner, saw its original justification in the second World War in terms of unfinished business in this island and the fear of precipitating another Civil War.

That was reinforced by opposition to great power politics in the Cold War, although the former Taoiseach, Mr Charles Haughey, no slouch at defending national sovereignty, made clear in a Dail debate in the 80s that Ireland had "never been politically or ideologically neutral". He hinted broadly that a resolution of the Northern question would render military neutrality redundant.

It is an argument that Fine Gael would certainly find appealing.

In Europe Ireland has found it increasingly embarrassing to argue the case against a security and defence dimension to the Union. It held the line in Amsterdam but the argument that if you are part of a club from which you draw substantial resources you should be prepared to defend it will not go away. Non-aligned Austria and Sweden are both re-examining their position.

Their defence of the status quo was facilitated by British and Danish hostility not to collective defence but to the mechanism proposed, the Western European Union. That opposition way evolve if the US reappraises its approach to European security and NATO.

While the Government case for holding the referendums on the Amsterdam Treaty and the Belfast Agreement may be weak, the Taoiseach's contention that both votes reflect important complementary dimensions of the State's international engagement is perfectly valid.

Both represent, Amsterdam albeit half-heartedly, attempts to reflect increasing interdependence in political structures which involve the sharing of sovereignty with trusted partners previously at war. Security is thus inevitably going to play an uneasy part in both sets of relationships.

The result is that although the Irish Government is unlikely to face demands from the unionists for an all-Ireland defence dimension, an unwillingness in the South to even contemplate one could be a political hostage to those who wish to see the South as involved in a takeover bid rather than a mutual sharing process.

I for one would not put money on the longevity of this sacred cow.

Patrick Smyth

Patrick Smyth

Patrick Smyth is former Europe editor of The Irish Times