Security man wins right to proceed with case against Red Cow Inn

Robert Renehan claims he was injured by car outside nightclub

The Red Cow Inn. File Photograph: Brenda Fitzsimons/The Irish Times

A security man can proceed with his legal action against a nightclub after the Supreme Court found his case was brought to the personal injuries board within the time limits required by law.

The law governing time limits for the bringing of personal injury cases provides for a “very generous disapplication of the Statute of Limitations”, the court said.

The Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB ) Act 2003, which set up what is now called "InjuriesBoard.ie", provides a "very wide" standstill period for the two-year deadline for the bringing of cases to it, in certain circumstances, Mr Justice Donnell O'Donnell said in a unanimous judgment of the three-judge court.

The case concerned security officer, Robert Renehan, Castle Hall, Swords, Co Dublin, who sued T & S Taverns t/a Red Cow Inn, Naas Road, Dublin, arising out of an incident at "Club Diva" on July 14th, 2007.

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He claimed, while working on security at the Red Cow complex, he was injured when a car drove through a number of bollards, mounted a footpath and struck him. The driver was subsequently identified.

He brought a personal injuries claim in May 2010 against the owner of the Red Cow, Thomas Moran, later replaced as defendant by the club operators, T & S Taverns. That company argued Mr Renehan should have sued the car driver and sought to have his case dismissed against it on grounds it was not brought within the required deadline.

The High Court rejected that argument and the company appealed that decision.

Giving the Supreme Court decision, Mr Justice O’Donnell said, under the PIAB Act, a claim for personal injury must first go for assessment to the InjuriesBoard.ie. It was set up to facilitate early resolution of claims, thereby reducing legal costs, particularly for insurers.

Where a claim is unresolved, it may only go before the courts if the board issues an authorisation allowing that.

In personal injury matters, there is a two year Statute of Limitations from the date of the incident to the deadline for bringing the application to the board, the judge said. As the process takes some time, the 2003 Act provides for a further standstill period while the application is being considered, he said.

The Act also provides the board can make rules allowing it issue an authorisation in circumstances including where, as in this case, the name of the defendant was changed due to genuine oversight or ignorance.

Mr Justice O’Donnell said the 2003 Act as a whole was drafted with a view to introducing a novel compulsory procedure in the process of civil litigation which may involve the limitation of constitutional rights.

Accordingly, it created a “very wide standstill period” during which the Statute of Limitations does not run which, in the standard case, is six months. There was was no doubt these proceedings were commenced within six months of when the injuries board issued a second authorisation after the name of the defendant was changed.

The Statute of Limitations was correctly disapplied in this case, he ruled.