ANALYSIS:THE FINE Gael-Labour government of 1981 was in "real danger of getting too close to the IRA" on the Maze hunger strike, the country's top civil servant warned as the prison fast entered its 20th week.
Secretary to the government Dermot Nally told taoiseach Garret FitzGerald in a strongly worded memo that, in the news media, “our demands are becoming indistinguishable from theirs”.
This posed “real and urgent dangers” because paramilitary prisoners in the South might join the protest: “What do we do if Portlaoise [prison] erupts?”
Nally warned against making public criticism of the British government’s approach. Despite the urgency of the hunger strike situation, there were “larger issues” involved and a major rift between the two governments would cause long-term damage to both countries.
The revealing memo by the late civil servant was written on July 21st, 1981, three days after a major riot outside the British embassy in Ballsbridge, where 200 people, including 120 gardaí, were injured.
He was commenting on a two- page appeal to the taoiseach from government press secretary and former RTÉ broadcaster, the late Liam Hourican, also on July 21st.
With hunger striker and abstentionist TD Kieran Doherty approaching death, Hourican argued for a public critique of the British government for failing to heed advice from Dublin on how to deal with the dispute.
He called for “a strong, unapologetic assertion of the rightness of our point of view, and the error of the British position”.
The document has come to light in newly declassified files. The Nally memo is typed on the second page of Hourican’s message as a commentary and is addressed directly to FitzGerald. Nally writes: “I believe there is a real danger of getting too close to the IRA on all this. Our demands are becoming indistinguishable from theirs – in the public press.
“There are real and urgent dangers for us in this identification. What do we do if Portlaoise [prison] erupts?
“Whatever we may think about them, the British are nearer the ground in dealing with the strike. They have their faults and undeniably made mistakes.
“But we should not compound them by trying to say what exactly they should or should not do.
“Our advice must always be based on second-hand information and cannot be tactical – only strategic.
“Though it may seem irrelevant at this point, there are larger issues, and any mistakes of emphasis made by us in relation to the hunger strike can endanger relations – just as much as mistakes made by them – to the ultimate loss of both countries.”
In a separate internal memo dated July 24th, senior Irish official DM Neligan complains about the paucity of information coming from the British side:
“From time to time since the hunger strikes began we have confirmed to the British the importance of keeping us informed about developments.
“We have made the point that the government here is arguably under more pressure on the subject of the hunger strike than the British government, and have asked for a full and rapid flow of information.
“They do give us some account of developments, notably in regard to the decline and death of hunger strikers. However, it is in general the case that not much other information reaches us spontaneously, and we generally have to look for it.”
Recalling this period in his 1991 autobiography All in a Life, FitzGerald writes of how the Irish support for the mediation efforts of the Catholic hierarchy's Commission for Justice and Peace was frustrated by a "ham-fisted" British government decision to enter direct behind-the-scenes negotiations with the IRA.
