With the US-imposed deadline on Saddam Hussein expired, British and US troops are in the final stages of deployment for invasion, writes Dr Tom Clonan
Elements of the US 1st Marine Expeditionary Force have entered the UN Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) - a 10 mile-wide strip of land on the border between Kuwait and Iraq.
US troops are believed to have also entered the northern sector of the DMZ, deploying to forward positions south of Umm Qasr and Safwan.
With US and British troops now concentrated in assembly areas just south of the DMZ, the objective of this deployment would be to secure allied positions from possible pre-emptive strikes by the Iraqis.
A further objective would be to conduct reconnaissance and clear obstacles and minefields in advance of the imminent ground assault. To this end, combat engineers and assault pioneers will be deployed along the coalition axis of advance to conduct specialist searches and assist in the co-ordination of their plan of attack.
This first deployment will be followed by an intensive air assault on Iraqi positions throughout the country. Dominated by advanced cruise missiles (ACMs) and guided munitions, the air campaign will be designed to strip Iraq of any air defence assets that it retains, and military command and control centres. The air campaign will be accompanied in due course by a concurrent ground attack, including an assault on Basra and the envelopment of Baghdad.
It is now believed that a massive armoured thrust towards Baghdad will be conducted by elements of the US 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanised). This force will deploy directly north in an attempt to encircle the capital city and Saddam's hometown of Tikrit.
A second thrust consisting of the US 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the UK 1st Armoured Division will deployed on the flank of the main attack and will be tasked with the assault and capture of Basra. Meanwhile, elements of the US 101st and 82nd Airborne will be airlifted to key objectives in northern and western Iraq. The armoured offensives are expected to be reinforced and consolidated in the coming weeks by troops from the US 4th Infantry Division (Mechanised) and the US 1st Armoured Division.
The armoured advance towards Baghdad and Basra will consist of a number of key manoeuvre elements. These will include the forward element termed the "screen". This lead element consists of troops equipped with lightly armed reconnaissance vehicles, such as British Scimitar fighting vehicles and US Humvees. This point formation will be given close air support in the form of helicopter gunships and fighter aircraft. This will be followed by the main force of armour, consisting of US Abrams and British Challenger main battle tanks. Accompanying this force in turn will be mechanised infantry mounted in armoured personnel carriers (APCs). It will be the unenviable task of these troops to dismount and engage any enemy positions encountered on the advance. In the black humour of the battlefield, the dismountable infantry element is jokingly referred to by tank crews as the "disposable" element.
For their successful execution, the extended armoured thrusts envisaged for the capture of Basra and Baghdad will have required intensive training and forward planning on the part of participating units. In what the military refer to as the "C4" paradigm, the major challenge facing these troops will be the command, control, communication and co-ordination demands necessary for this form of warfare. Unit commanders have to be highly skilled and disciplined in these areas in order to successfully manoeuvre to objectives whilst avoiding fratricidal "friendly fire" incidents or "collateral damage" among the civilian population.
Termed by the military "advance to contact" operations, such tactics place unit commanders under a great deal of physical and mental stress. Such operations require individual officers to direct high-tempo combat operations whilst constantly updating and adjusting to planning instructions and emerging battlefield data. This would include, for example, the co-ordinates and timings of artillery bombardments, the co-ordinating instructions associated with air strikes, the locations and activities of friendly forces, and of course, enemy action.
In the Gulf War in 1991, this order of battle was deployed in open desert where friendly unit boundaries and enemy positions could be clearly identified. Even in this environment, many US and British troops lost their lives in what the military euphemistically term "blue on blue" or "friendly fire" incidents. In the coming conflict, complex formations may be required to fight in the close confines of city streets. They may also have to do so at night. Faced with such a scenario, US and British commanders will be hoping that digitised communication systems and a highly disciplined approach to fire control will limit such casualties.
In recent weeks the world has witnessed the psychological operations (Psyops) and propaganda campaign aimed at producing the spontaneous surrender of Saddam's forces in the field. At this point, such a surrender would probably represent the best hope for the limitation of civilian and military casualties in the coming weeks. Ironically perhaps, on the eve of war, many Americans, British and Iraqis alike will be united in the hope of a prompt and decisive conclusion to any hostilities.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired army officer with experience in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. He is a fellow of the US-based Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He currently lectures in the School of Media, DIT.
