The bicentenary of the 1821 start of the Greek war of independence from the Ottoman empire has prompted several academic studies, chief of them Mark Mazower’s The Greek Revolution: 1821 and the Making of Modern Europe. The war (which continued until 1827) is now referred to as “the Greek Revolution” because it indicates the creation, on liberal lines, of the first modern state in Europe. Well, almost.
The author acknowledges that the “Septinsular Republic” of the seven principal Ionian islands (1800-1807) was “the first modern Greek state”, even though Greece itself had not yet come into existence, and the islands looked across at a mainland that remained under Turkish rule.
Kotsonis excellently details the way that the “revolution” simmered while the imperial powers of Russia, Britain and France weighed up their territorial options: the war of independence could not have opened if diplomatic conditions had not permitted it. It was a “crooked line” rather than a straight one, leading directly to war and then independence.
The impetus may have come from Greeks in Odesa, but the decisions were made by the great powers, as they were at Vienna in 1815 and Versailles in 1918-19 and, as we see only too horribly today, on the future of Ukraine (where the Greek “revolution” began!)
On the nature of “violence”, Kotsonis offers that it was caused, and justified, by the concept of a unified Greek-Christian state whose primary purpose was to defeat and eliminate the Muslim Turk. “It was a Christian war of liberation from an alien, Oriental power.”
[ Old-fashioned Greece has no chance of becoming truly developedOpens in new window ]
This seems to explain how Greece became, then and now, the border of Europe and its bastion against immigration, which is largely Muslim. As a historian’s argument, this is both simplistic and naive, ignoring as it does the chessboard profile of the Balkans. His story ignores the entire “Great Idea” (first enunciated in 1844) which aimed to embrace all ethnic Greeks and directly or indirectly caused the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and the disastrous Asia Minor campaign of 1920-22, which humiliated and bankrupted Greece morally and politically.
The modern state was created by the fiat of the Russian, British and French empires. The author, although Greek in origin, is a Russian specialist (at New York University) and his bias in this book towards the Russian contribution to Greek independence is overwhelming and at times alarmingly overstated. His assertion that “Greek independence became a certainty because of Russian arms and diplomatic persistence” is simply unsustainable.
One “Russian” fact is, however, inescapable: the “revolution” was conceived in Odesa, which, like Taganrog, Nizhyn and Kherson (now fought over by Ukraine and Russia), was originally a Greek city, and remains a matter of concern for diasporic Greece today.
Kotsonis’s book needs to be read alongside Liberalism after the Revolution: the intellectual foundations of the Greek state c. 1830-1880 by Michalis Sotiropoulos because the emergence of violence and that of liberalism have coincided throughout modern Greek history and have bedevilled the creation of a modern democratic state up to the present day.
Kotsonis tells us that “Solidarity within the elite” had effectively suppressed discontent, which was certainly true of the well-established landowners and tax-gatherers under Ottoman rule of mainland Greece. It remains true of conservative Greece today, and explains the virtual exclusion of the Left from political life. It also explains the continuing presence of discontent and the undercurrent of violence (which frequently breaks the surface) within the Greek state which is, admittedly, not within the scope of this book.
In Kotsonis’s thesis, war and nationalism were synonymous, but he seems to discount the continuing presence of violence. To refer in his epilogue to Pontic Greeks coming into the new state, without referring to the violence (both physical and mental) which that influx has occasioned, is to limit his argument about how “violence” exists in the modern state.
Kotsonis acknowledges that the consequences of creating the state of Greece “are still with us” and that the status of modern Greece is “up for grabs”. He can say that “1821 is a current event” and that “the Revolution is still with us and there are new stories to be told”, but he doesn’t tell them, although his references to his research make it clear that he knows what they are.
The insistence throughout this book on the polarisation of Christian and Muslim conceals the fact that languages, faiths, cultures and, indeed, landscapes themselves can never be defined by nation states (as Kapka Kassabova shows in her recent Elixir: in the Valley at the End of Time).
Kotsonis’s writing is casual, and refreshingly unacademic, but the lack of a bibliography is disappointing, and the author’s suggestions for further reading are surprisingly superficial.
- Richard Pine’s books include Greece Through Irish Eyes (2015) and The Eye of the Xenos: Letters about Greece (2021). He contributes Letter from Greece to The Irish Times.
