The protest movement in Iran is unlikely to topple the deeply entrenched clerical regime, which can count on the support of the hardline parliament, the military, security agencies, wealthy charitable institutions, the business community, and many Iranians who fear instability.
Unless there is a mass revolt against the clerics to match the 1978-1979 revolution which ousted the shah, or the army switches sides or takes power, the regime is set to remain in place.
The 1978-1979 revolution’s leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had systematically prepared for years to seize power as well as eliminate competitors. The current protesters have no identified charismatic leaders with a plan for the transition from theocracy to democracy. The protesters’ slogan, “Women, life, freedom,” is not a roadmap.
The regime has weathered a series of protests, beginning with the six-day 1999 student revolt sparked by the closure of a reformist newspaper. Next came the 2009 Green Revolution against the victory of the hardline candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a rigged presidential election. This was followed by economic protests in 2017, the mass uprising in Bloody November 2019 against increased fuel prices, and the death in September 2022 of Mahsa Amini after her arrest by morality police for not completely covering her hair.
The 2019 urban and rural uprising continued until mid-2020 and was the most violent. The ongoing protests, led by young women, have energised Iranians of all ages from all levels of society and from all 31 provinces. The demonstrations have also drawn in ethnic minorities in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and Khuzestan, which accounts for 57 per cent of Iran’s oil output. The objective is liberation from socially, culturally, economically and politically stifling clerical rule.
The clerics have claimed the protests are a “revolt against God” and have blamed the unrest on outside interference. Many Iranians dismiss these claims.
The clerics have lost credibility due to mismanagement, corruption, and the misuse of religion as the basis for their reign. Activists make no distinction between hardliners and reformists, who, since the revolution, have alternated in government, ushering in periods of brutal repression and relative relaxation.
This week, former president Mohammed Khatami, the cleric who leads the reformist camp, spoke out against regime change but dismissed the idea that the protests were instigated from abroad. He warned these “bitter events” are generated from within the country. “Ignoring or denying the bad situation that is imposed on people does not eliminate dissatisfaction,” Mr Khatami said. Designating protests as “riots” to justify harsh counter measures only makes the situation worse, he added.
Instead of listening to his advice, the hard-line clerics in power, bolstered by a loyal military, are certain to continue repression and refuse to concede protesters’ demands, as this would demonstrate weakness. They believe they must demonstrate strength to survive.