ANALYSIS:THE SUDDEN collapse of Muammar Gadafy's defences in Tripoli is certain to shock Arab rulers kept in power by loyal generals and troops rather than by the support of their subjects. These rulers rely on praetorian guards and arrays of security services to protect them from the people and to prevent the sort of traditional coup that toppled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during the popular uprising early this year.
Such rulers weave webs of political and commercial interests between themselves and senior ranks of the military and security agencies in the belief that partners do not mount coups.
The Libyan case is quite different from that of Egypt. Gadafy initially faced a popular rebellion, inspired by the Egyptian uprising. But when he used force against the rebels, they took up arms and conquered Libya with the help of Nato airpower.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation bombed his military assets and provided air cover for fighters. The dual nature of the military opposition – domestic and international – is therefore all the more worrying for some Arab rulers and citizens.
The success of the western intervention will not be lost on Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, another Arab maverick who adopts a line independent of the West and relies on his army and security forces to crack down on unrest.
Now that Tripoli has fallen to the Libyan rebels, the Syrian opposition will be encouraged to carry on in the hope that once Libya’s rebel National Transitional Council is installed in the capital as well as in Benghazi, international military pressure might be brought to bear on Assad. The Syrian rebels could also be encouraged to introduce more weapons into their struggle, although they do not have the advantage of controlling a large portion of the country, as did the Libyan rebels based in Benghazi and the east.
The fall of Gadafy, a third veteran Arab leader who ruled for four decades, is certain to make remaining autocrats more amenable to popular demands for democracy, and may prompt recalcitrants who have promised reforms to implement them. The generals who took over from Mubarak and have been blocking reforms are also likely to feel vulnerable.
The initial reaction of Arab regimes to developments in Libya has been muted.
On Sunday, as the rebels closed in on Tripoli, Tunisia recognised the transitional council as Libya’s legitimate government. Egypt has followed, becoming the 29th country to do so. More may be expected in the coming days. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood congratulated the rebels, who include large numbers of Muslim fundamentalists, notably fighters whose martial skills were honed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Many Arab citizens who are happy to see an end to the Gadafy regime are, however, deeply suspicious of the Nato powers that took part in the air campaign. Italy and France were former colonial rulers with major stakes in the Libyan oil sector, while the US is regarded as a neo-colonial power determined to extend its military reach into north Africa and impose US-style “democracy” on Arabs.
Arab leftists and liberals are particularly concerned that the US will seek to turn countries newly liberated from autocrats into dependent clients. Muslim fundamentalists do not appear to be overly concerned about this possibility. The Libyan rebels have acknowledged their debt to Nato and this is certain to be reflected in the political positions the transitional council adopts internationally and the economic ties the country develops with western oil companies.
The take-over of the country by the rebels is unlikely to be smooth. Libya, a vast land with a small but scattered population of 6.5 million, will not be easy to unify or to govern. Infrastructure is basic, with many outlying areas difficult to reach – and, probably, to control.
There are many factions in the rebel camp, based on geography, tribal affiliations, urban and rural residence, and liberal and fundamentalist politics. Fundamentalists who took an active part in the fighting are themselves split between moderate elements and ultra-orthodox Salafis, who seek to impose their ideology and practices on the populace.
While the transitional council has said that members of the former regime will be welcome if they want to join the new order, Libyans who took part in the rebellion early on and who fought against Gadafy’s forces cannot be expected to be forgiving of those who stuck with him till the bitter end. In a society where blood feuds are common, Gadafy’s fellow tribesmen could become targets for revenge.
The victors will also have to arrange a rapprochement with the Libyan entrepreneurial class that benefited economically from Gadafy’s rule – or risk even more economic dislocation than that already caused by the civil conflict.
Libya’s new rulers can, however, tap the country’s $70 billion sovereign wealth fund to finance reconstruction and development projects with the aim of convincing Libyans that the era of corruption and siphoning off the country’s wealth is over. Quick results will be necessary if the rebel government is to retain domestic credibility.
At regional and international levels, Libya’s transitional council will have to establish its legitimacy and credentials. This will be difficult in the Arab world where most members of the 22-state Arab League – even those who initially supported the Nato mission – have been concerned from the outset over Nato’s involvement. The disastrous examples of the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dominate the minds of Arab leaders and citizens.
The fact that Afghans and Iraqis do not live secure lives or enjoy the benefits of democracy does not encourage Arabs to view western intervention with optimism.
The council will have an easier time internationally because once the fighting is over, the Nato powers that took part in the campaign will withdraw with a sigh of relief and declare victory: “mission accomplished”. While these powers can be expected to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs as much as they are allowed, the Libyans will be in charge, blamed for mismanaging affairs or congratulated for accomplishments.
Michael Jansen is Middle East Analyst for
The Irish Times