BOOK OF THE DAY: Soldiers of Folly: The IRA Border Campaign 1956-1962. By Barry Flynn. The Collins Press, pp 214 . €24.95
MILITARY ENDEAVOURS by Irish republicans often end in failure but some failures turn into triumphs, such as the 1916 Rising, whereas others just remain failures, like the ill-fated IRA assault on Northern Ireland that began on December 12th, 1956, and ended on February 26th, 1962.
The basic strategy for “Operation Harvest” was developed by Seán Cronin, later to become this newspapers Washington correspondent. The aim was to establish a series of “liberated zones” in nationalist areas along the Border, to be used as bases for conducting the fight to end British rule once and for all. Interestingly, the concept was still current in IRA circles in the 1980s and was held up by the dissidents as an alternative to the peace strategy embraced by Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. Inspired by the Cork guerrilla commander in the War of Independence, Tom Barry, the IRA leaders of the 1950s set up “flying columns” to harass, and eventually hound out the British forces. But there were fundamental problems with this approach as applied in the North.
There was only sporadic and inadequate popular support and involvement. Many of the “volunteers” did not come from the locality but from other, far-flung parts of the island. And there was no possibility that this strategy would win any support among the Protestant community who comprised the overwhelming majority of the population.
Judging from this highly-readable and often-dramatic account by Belfast journalist Barry Flynn, the wishes of the Protestant unionist community simply did not figure in IRA reasoning. Presumably, the idea was that, once the British had pulled out, they would “see sense” and recover their former republican ideology of 1798.
Leaving the politics aside, even in terms of military efficiency the campaign was a disaster. The high point was the raid on the barracks of the Royal Ulster Constabulary at Brookeborough, Co Fermanagh, on New Year’s Day 1957. Were it not for the tragic loss of life the author could be writing about an episode from the Keystone Cops, such was the amateurish nature of the attack.
Two members of the raiding party, Seán South (28) from Limerick and Feargal O’Hanlon (20) from Monaghan town, died from their wounds, although there are suggestions the latter’s life could have been saved with proper medical attention.
Curiously, this military catastrophe generated the highest level of support the IRA would receive in the entire six years of the campaign.
Although the subject was from another part of Limerick, Seán South of Garryowenquickly became a classic rebel song, as did Dominic Behan's somewhat more reflective, The Patriot Game which, in turn apparently, inspired Bob Dylan's With God on Our Side.
The funeral of Seán South became a national occasion. But the sympathy was short-lived and, within six months, the newly-elected Fianna Fáil government led by Éamon de Valera reintroduced internment without trial and sent 2,000 soldiers to the Border.
Dev’s successor Seán Lemass took an equally hard line against IRA actions because, he said, “far from contributing to the reunification of the country, it is obvious that they are having the very opposite effect and are, indeed, a main impediment to the development of a more constructive approach”.
Lemass sought to end the “cold war” between the two parts of the island through his historic visit to Stormont in 1965 to see his counterpart, Capt Terence O’Neill. But a further 30 years would pass, along with many tragic deaths, before the “more constructive approach” he spoke of would take hold in the form of the peace process. This book is a worthy contribution towards explaining why it took so long.
Deaglan de Bréadún is Political Correspondent of The Irish Times