It was a great week for calling for debates about neutrality.
Normally, it’s one of the rules of Irish politics that when someone says we should have a debate or a conversation about something, they mean they want a change in the way something operates. Micheál Martin, Leo Varadkar and Simon Coveney have been saying for ages now that we need a debate or even a “mature debate” about our neutrality. President Michael D Higgins also got in on the act last week, telling journalists in Austria that he wants to see “a well-informed debate” about Ireland’s neutrality.
I suspect Michael D’s conception of the outcome of that debate might be rather different to Martin, Varadkar and Coveney – though needless to say he would never transgress on matters that are constitutionally the preserve of the executive. Perhaps he will find a way to enlighten us on his views while not crossing the line of constitutional propriety. I wouldn’t rule it out.
The Government will argue for a form of neutrality that would allow Ireland to play its part in new EU defence arrangements and abandon the triple lock
It seems to me that the Government is trying to nudge public opinion towards a change not so much in the high-minded principle of neutrality – to which there remains significant public attachment – but in how that principle is applied in practice. In particular the Government is likely to argue for an “evolution” of neutrality that allows it to pay more attention to our defence – observed in most countries as a core function of government, but which has been largely ignored in this country.
Specifically, the Government will argue for a form of neutrality that would allow Ireland to play its part in new EU defence arrangements and abandon the triple lock. This is the requirement for a government decision, Dáil approval and a UN Security Council resolution before Irish troops can be committed abroad, and which therefore grants Russia and China (as well as the other permanent members of the UN Security Council) a veto on those Irish decisions. With the invasion of Ukraine demonstrating the threat that Russia now poses to eastern and central Europe – ask the Poles and the Baltic nations if you doubt this – they are likely to argue that the triple lock should go.
Strategic compass
What else? The “strategic compass” agreed by EU leaders at the most recent summit commits EU members to spend more on defence, develop their military and security capacity and co-operate more with Nato. EU documents describe it as an agreement “to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity and willingness to act, strengthen our resilience, and invest more and better in our defence capabilities”. Exactly what is required of Ireland, and everyone else, will become clearer this year. But whatever way you cut it, it will be a substantial step up militarily and a step away from the sort of neutrality that we have traditionally practised.
The Taoiseach has actually given reasonably clear signals about what this may mean. In a speech to Ógra Fianna Fáil last week he referred to Russian sea and air exercises, saying: “In the sea and air around our island we have seen actions taken which have no innocent explanation. The fact that we do not have the capacity to carry out key functions is something we simply have to address.”
Conversations with senior officials suggest that this is likely to mean that Ireland’s naval and air defence capacities, especially a radar system, will be significantly ramped up.
Doesn’t this butt up against our neutrality? Well, that depends on how you view it. There have been, broadly, three basic conceptions of our neutrality.
To be neutral in this model is not to be defenceless, but to have a tradition of independent thought and action
There’s the current model, which allows Ireland to co-operate with some minimal EU defence arrangements, facilitate US military transits (without asking too many questions) and proclaim our neutrality as morally superior to the militarists of Nato countries (while overlooking the fact that they have actually provided the security that has enabled Ireland to thrive). It’s a bit of a fudge, but by and large people have been happy with it.
The second conception draws an equivalence between the global power blocs – sure, Russia is bad and China is brutal, but so are the US and the West – and says we should remain independent of both. It sends “solidarity” to Ukraine, but not much else.
The third idea of neutrality is the model Ireland is likely to move towards. To be neutral in this model is not to be defenceless, but to have a tradition of independent thought and action, of loyalty to UN principles of human rights and multilateralism, to recognise that the EU is one of the primary forces for these principles in the world and to be willing to play a role in the defence of those ideas, and of Europe.
Finnish defence
The single most important part of Irish foreign policy is that we are members of the EU and want it to be a success. Russia has been conducting political and cyber operations against the EU for a long time now; since the invasion of Ukraine it now presents a clear and present military threat. The EU will respond to that. Ireland now needs to decide whether it plays a role in that.
Finland, a neutral country, also takes its defence seriously. It has a large and well-equipped military
Yesterday, Micheál Martin visited Helsinki for talks with the Finnish prime minister, Sanna Marin. Those who advocate for a more social democratic Ireland, with greater state provision, higher taxes and a more expansive welfare state, have long pointed to Finland as an example to follow. But Finland, a neutral country, also takes its defence seriously. It has a large and well-equipped military, and prepares constantly for the attack it hopes will never come, but today looks more possible than ever – an invasion from Russia. They believe the best way to prevent an attack is to be ready to beat it back. We could learn about more than social welfare from the Finns.