The European Commission is advancing new proposals aimed at strengthening the armour of Europe’s democracies against state-sponsored disruption. National intelligence agencies across the EU are to be encouraged to share information more urgently and transparently on attempts by Russia to influence elections and distort public debate. The initiative comes amid mounting evidence of covert operations attributed to Moscow: everything from drone incursions to online harassment campaigns. Such activities are designed to unsettle, to provoke and to weaken confidence in democracy.
The conflict initiated by Russia no longer takes places solely on the battlefields of Ukraine. It reaches into the essential machinery of democratic societies. The threat it poses is real and significant. It requires a response that is measured and robust, particularly where digital regulation intersects with national and European security.
European Commissioner Michael McGrath has noted that Russian influence efforts have become more sophisticated, better co-ordinated and far better resourced. The aim is not just to engineer a specific electoral outcome – although that has been attempted in Romania and Moldova. It is to erode trust in institutions, amplify doubt and deepen division. This work is incremental and often deniable.
The Commission’s initiative is likely to sharpen existing tensions between the EU and a number of US-owned social-media platforms, supported by the Trump administration, which argue that European rules amount to censorship and unfair targeting of American companies. These arguments, while predictable, cannot be ignored. Regulation that aspires to protect democracy must itself be grounded in clear democratic principles.
RM Block
For Ireland, which hosts the European headquarters of many of the largest platforms, the implications are immediate and significant. Definitions of disinformation, foreign interference and systemic risk must be transparent, rooted in democratic values and applied consistently. Without this, regulation risks becoming either ineffectual or politicised. Moreover, this project is only one part of what has become an increasingly open confrontation between the EU and Russia – a proxy conflict waged through digital subversion, covert sabotage and manipulation of public debate. Europe’s answer must include deeper security cooperation, enhanced intelligence exchange and a coherent digital strategy.
Ireland, as a strategic base for global platforms, will have to shoulder a central role. That means stronger regulatory enforcement, greater investment in intelligence and infrastructure resilience, and a long-overdue strengthening of national security capabilities. Russia’s hybrid tactics do not respect traditional boundaries. The response, therefore, must be equally agile.
