The stock market is wobbling after a few years of soaring based on a highly speculative AI trade that is fuelled by enormous corporate debts. Crashes usually follow the advent of a new technology, and if and when this one happens, it will have been the most predicted crash the world has ever known.
Ireland was one of the worst hit countries in the last crash. But have we actually learned the right lessons from that experience? Talking to many of the leading experts for a book project, and comparing it with the stories that we tell about that time, the answer seems to be that we haven’t.
While too much private debt was one of the reasons for the unsustainable boom, that reality seems to have morphed into the first story that many people tell about that time: “the State spent too much”. This is part of the reason that we now hear so much about high public spending. But Ireland was then and is now among the lowest spenders in Europe (even comparing our modified GNI to everybody else’s GDP). While some of that spending was unwise (and plenty now could be spent better), the level of spending wasn’t actually the problem.
Most experts take the view that the real problem was taxes. Relying on tax intake from a speculative property bubble, we slashed income taxes. When the bubble burst, it was our revenue that was the big problem: there was a big hole where our income taxes used to be that were no longer filled by those property-related taxes.
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Even in recent years, budgets have continuously cut taxes while relying on volatile corporate tax revenue, suggesting we may not have learned our lesson.
For some, including many opposition politicians at the time, the crash was seen as Europe’s fault. While Europe made plenty of mistakes, our own systems also failed.
On September 30th 2008, after a panicked meeting between banks, politicians, and officials, the decision was made to issue a banking guarantee. It was poorly designed, protecting both ordinary depositors and the profits of speculative investors. What was unforgivable was arriving to that point without making a plan for exactly this scenario. Northern Rock in the UK had been nationalised after a bank run seven months earlier, and Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy two weeks earlier. Peter Nyberg, a Finnish finance expert, laid a lot of blame on “determined optimism” which meant that our system was caught so unprepared in spite of growing evidence of a looming collapse.
[ Ten years on: The night of the 280-word guarantee that cost €32bnOpens in new window ]
The question now is: are we once again determinedly optimistic, or is our system really planning for the worst? Our last round of tax cuts hints that our strategy may still be closing our eyes and praying.
The third story that we’ve told is that austerity worked. Ireland is often cited as the poster child for austerity, and when I talk to non-experts, I often hear this explanation of Ireland’s recovery. This is the most dangerous story, because it lays the groundwork for doing it again. Austerity has always been our go-to strategy – summed up by Charlie McCreevy’s famous theory of fiscal management: “When I have it, I spend it. When I don’t, I don’t.”
It’s true we did austerity, and then the economy recovered. It seems like a simple equation. But the real question is whether the economy recovered because of austerity or in spite of it. While austerity may have been necessary because of the scale of money haemorrhaging through the bank guarantee, Stephen Kinsella, professor of economics at the University of Limerick, concluded that “we are not a role model [for austerity], but a cautionary tale”.
The real reason that our economy recovered was because the US recovered, largely through innovative monetary policy and a tech boom that led to growth in Ireland. It wasn’t because we were good children who took our austerity medicine. As the political economist Mark Blyth has shown, austerity doesn’t lead to growth or recovery, outside of very exceptional circumstances (the most important being that you’re the only one doing it).
The only austerity measures that really solved any problems were the least popular: USC and local property tax, which helped to improve our incredibly narrow tax base.
The story that we don’t tell, and the lesson we haven’t learned, is the long-term cost of austerity. The most-discussed long-term effect is the hole in our housing stock: at least 250,000 missing houses and a lost decade of infrastructure spending.
But austerity has left many scars: closed community centres and poverty programmes; youth services that are still funded below their 2008 level and that have to turn kids in disadvantaged communities away at the door; less State capacity in key social areas like migrant integration. To save €250,000 a year, we closed the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism which quietly solved a lot of problems that a diverse society throws up – like building trust between migrant communities and the police, working with hospitals to adapt scrubs for woman Muslim doctors and supporting services to adapt to working with new arrivals. We closed the Combat Poverty Agency, which helped us to understand and tackle the root causes of the type of entrenched disadvantage that wreaks havoc in Dublin’s city centre and communities and towns across Ireland. We also created an even more centralised State, after we abolished the town and borough councils, which means that citizens now have a very limited ability to get involved in politics, contributing to disillusionment and a fractured social contract.
These institutions and investments were seen as a luxury during the crisis, driven in no small part by political ideology. But as antisocial behaviour, low social trust, and anti-establishment sentiment become a prominent part of public life, we may need to rethink that analysis. We rarely draw the line back to the decisions we made in the crisis. But extensive evidence shows that these “soft” programmes prevent much bigger problems, and much bigger spending – on young people in prisons or long-term unemployed, the health impacts of loneliness, crime, low social trust, burned out asylum centres, riots and attacks on politicians.
Austerity also left us with a much more unequal economy: wages decreased and jobs contracted in the domestic economy while they expanded in the international economy, giving us the two Irelands that exist alongside each other today.
If we tell the wrong stories, we will learn the wrong lessons. Time may now be running out to learn the right ones.
Keire Murphy is a freelance policy researcher, public commentator and co-host of the ‘Get Sh*t Done’ podcast














