The sigh of relief from capitals on this side of the Atlantic was palpable. As the US midterms loomed, the Carnegie Europe think tank had headlined a gloomy and typical piece of analysis: “Europeans must prepare for the post-Biden era.”
The European Council on Foreign Relations had spelled it out: “The results could impact on US foreign policy in two main areas: American support for Ukraine and the transition to clean energy. Beyond that, a strong showing for the Republicans would influence America’s political messaging on China and attitudes towards Europe’s conservative strongmen. It could also set the scene for the potential return of Trump or one of his followers in 2024.” Europe did not see the prospects for transatlantic relations in a sunny light.
Biden’s success, however, despite loss of control of the House of Representatives, promises a welcome policy continuity from Washington, not least in support for Ukraine to which the US has already committed some $52 billion, and, more broadly, what upbeat US National Security Council (NSC) member Amanda Sloat called the continued “revitalisation” of the European relationship with the US. That had been badly bruised by Donald Trump’s hostility to multilateralism and threats to Nato obligations. And it had been undermined earlier by a sense that the US was stepping away from European allies and commitments in Barack Obama’s strategic “turn to Asia”.
Sloat, who holds the NSC brief for Europe, was addressing the UCD, QUB and Georgetown University annual conference “Bridging the Atlantic – Ireland and the US” in the Royal Irish Academy on Tuesday.
A definition of Swiss neutrality remains elusive, but at least the debate has begun
No wonder Americans are flocking to see Civil War. Many believe a civil war is coming
Postponement of Senegal election a further sign of West Africa’s ominous drift from democracy
Could a Holy Land confederation offer a path to peace?
Dr Renata Dwan of the Chatham House think tank spoke also of the Ukraine crisis prompting an important and welcome renewed US engagement in Europe to the point of returning its troop levels on the continent to 100,000, up 20,000.
Yet getting the Europeans to sing from the same hymn sheet as the hawkish US over China will not be as easy as improving security co-operation, she warned. US prohibitions on the export of technology to China are seen by some European as having more to do with domestic sensitivity over jobs and protectionism than real security concerns. Countries such as Germany and Ireland, the few with trade surpluses with China, have clearly different interests to the US, and much more reason to want a normalisation of trade relations.
Dwan argues that a key difference between the European Union and the US remains diverging perspectives on the threats posed to each – for Europeans Russian military action in Ukraine has made Putin no less than an existential threat, both in security and economic/energy terms. The US sees Russia, on the other hand, as a second-order threat and considers containing China its number one – and also existential – priority.
The conference also heard how for Ireland new security challenges are changing the nature of its dialogue about its defence capabilities and orientation with partners on both sides of the Atlantic. Questions are being asked increasingly in Paris, Brussels and Washington, speakers observed, with allies pointedly referring to the recent Swedish and Finnish decisions to join Nato. Defence, and hence neutrality policy, they argue, can no longer be simply seen in the traditional context of territorial defence.
Former Finnish prime minister Prof Alexander Stubb echoed French arguments that although a warmer EU relationship with the US was welcome, it was increasingly clear that Europe needed ‘to become more self-reliant’ in defence
Dr Ed Burke of UCD pointed to the need to take seriously issues such as protecting intellectual property in the vital tech sector from international espionage and safeguarding communication cables off the southwest coast. Is there a role there, he asks, for the EU? Ireland, he points out, is also virtually defenceless against hybrid cyber warfare and has an almost non-existent military intelligence capability.
Speakers emphasised not only the need to strengthen our navy and air force but, as historian Prof Mary Daly argued, to “interrogate” what we mean by neutrality.
Former Finnish prime minister Prof Alexander Stubb echoed French arguments that although a warmer EU relationship with the US was welcome, it was increasingly clear that Europe needed “to become more self-reliant” in defence. That does not necessarily have to mean undermining Nato, a traditional criticism of the French. Its president, Emmanuel Macron, is trying to square that circle and tone down the French position in his new national strategic review. The strategic partnership with the US, he insists, “will remain fundamental and must remain ambitious, lucid and pragmatic”.
But Macron argues with Stubb that “When peace is back in Ukraine, we will need to assess all the consequences” through a “new security architecture” in Europe.
The Finn also suggested at the conference that there was potential in the new European Political Community, an informal platform initiated by Macron for broader political co-operation between the EU and its neighbours, to be the basis of such a new common security architecture. (The first summit meeting of the EPC took place in Prague in October.)